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Abstract: 
Some commentators argue that private religious schools are less likely to inculcate the attributes 
of good citizenship than traditional public schools (Gutmann, 1999), specifically proposing that 
private Islamic schools are relatively more likely to produce individuals sympathetic to terrorism 
(Stotsky, 2011). This study offers a preliminary examination of the question by studying the 
educational backgrounds of Western educated terrorists. While data are limited, in accord with 
prior work (Bergen & Pandey, 2005) findings indicate the vast majority of both Islamic and 
reactionary terrorists attended traditional public schools and had no religious education; hence 
findings suggest that early religious training and identification may actually encourage prosocial 
behavior.  
Keywords: terrorism, public schools, private schools, school choice, Islam, madrasa, Muslim, 
jihadist, right wing, homegrown terrorists. 
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With regards to three dimensions (reflection, skills, and attitudes) pupils at Islamic schools score 
considerably higher than pupils at comparable schools, and still higher than pupils at the 
average school. Only with regard to knowledge competence do pupils at Islamic schools score 
nearly the same as pupils at comparable schools, but significantly lower than pupils at the 
average school. These findings directly challenge the assumption that pupils at Islamic schools 
are less likely to cultivate the relevant civic virtues for Dutch society at large. Jaap Dronkers, 
2016, pp. 14-15. 
 The late, eminent sociologist Jaap Dronkers possessed an impressive set of academic 
skills and virtues (Wolf, 2016). He delved, courageously, into controversial topics with an open 
mind and an incisive set of analytic tools. The fruits of his scholarship included his pioneering 
study of the civic skills and attitudes of students in private Islamic schools in The Netherlands, 
published just before his untimely death. Contrary to popular belief, Dronkers concluded, Dutch 
Islamic schools appeared to be doing a good job of preparing students to be law-abiding, 
democratic citizens (Dronkers, 2016). In this article, we examine whether Dronkers’ findings 
regarding Dutch private schools and civic values appear to apply to the U.S. context and the most 
un-civic of behaviors: terrorism.     
Despite the considerable media and law enforcement attention it draws, terrorism in the 
West is rare, and typically conducted by individuals or small groups, limiting empirical analyses 
(Biglan, 2015; Berman et al., 2015).1 The extant empirical work on terrorism questions 
conventional wisdom about the phenomena. Pape’s profiles of modern suicide bombers as of 
2003 indicate that religion was a primary motivation in only 5% of cases. Rather “suicide 
                                                     
1 We thank Charles Leslie Glenn, Jr., of Boston University and Robert Maranto and Dirk C. van Raemdonck of the 
University of Arkansas for comments on earlier drafts. All remaining flaws are ours. Corresponding author is M. 




terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation rather than the product of Islamic 
fundamentalism” (Pape, 2005, p. 237). Terrorism has since evolved, with an incremental rise of 
Western born and raised individuals joining foreign battlefields or attempting to commit acts of 
terror in their homelands. Case studies employ political environment and socioeconomic 
variables to explain these individual decisions to participate in acts of terror. Possible causes of 
contemporary terrorism include religious indoctrination (Hindery, 2003; Schbley, 2003) and 
social and psychological alienation (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015; Stern, 2016). While studies try to 
examine potential causal variables that may explain radicalization, the individual, social and 
political variables involved are endogenous to other key variables such as religion and culture.  
Lyons-Padilla et al. (2015) finds that cultural homelessness and attendant alienation 
among American Muslim immigrants is associated with increased support for fundamentalist 
groups and extremist causes. Bhatt and Silber (2007) proposes four phases of radicalization for 
the Western jihadist terrorist: 1) pre-radicalization, 2) self-identification, 3) indoctrination and 4) 
jihadization. Religious education may play a role in these phases of radicalization. Often, private 
Islamic schools are accused of producing individuals who commit acts of terror (Stern, 2000), 
but Bergen & Pandey (2005) point out that Western jihadists largely do not attend Islamic 
schools. They note, “while madrassas may breed fundamentalists who have learned to recite the 
Koran in Arabic by rote, such schools do not teach the technical or linguistic skills necessary to 
be an effective terrorist.” (Bergen & Pandey, 2005, p. A23) Out of the 75 profiles of terrorists 
who attacked Western targets, only nine had attended madrasas. Their study did not parse out 
the data between homegrown vs. foreign terrorists and by schooling type, probably due to small 
sample size.  
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Few Western terrorists majored in religion during their religious studies (Gambetta, & 
Hertog, 2016). Classic work by Hoffer (1951) shows how radicals differ from the rest of society. 
Since many commentators see religious schooling as a form of indoctrination (Dawkins, 2006; 
Harris, 2011; Americans United, 2011), it is important to examine possible relationships between 
religious schooling and terrorism.  
The purpose of this study is to offer a preliminary exploration of whether religious 
schooling in general and Islamic schooling in particular is associated with participation in 
terrorism. American government and international aid agencies have funded programs to 
strengthen the educational effectiveness of public schools, but not religious schools, in majority-
Muslim nations since September 11, 2001. Efforts to reduce terrorism by replacing religious 
schools with public schools may be counter-productive. Experimental and quasi-experimental 
studies in the United States and Europe indicate that private school choice interventions tend to 
produce positive outcomes for civic values (Wolf, 2007; Forster, 2016), or at least do no harm in 
that area (Dronkers, 2004; Carlson, Chingos & Campbell, 2017). Thus, carefully designed school 
choice interventions may decrease terrorism by reducing the numbers of young recruits who 
attempt to commit violent acts.  
To explore the possibility that religious schooling might not be causing, and in fact might 
be hindering, terrorism, this article analyzes the schooling of native born Americans who 
succeeded in committing an act of terror inside the United States. We first outline the role of 
quality instruction grounded in an authentic understanding of Islamic tradition, culture, and 
values in discouraging terrorism, as well as the role of independent religious schools in 
delivering such instruction. The paper argues that decentralized and market based schooling 
better facilitates tolerance in comparison to centralized and government controlled schooling 
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(Berner, 2017; Coulson, 1999; Friedman, 2002; Glenn, De Groof, & Candal, 2012). We suggest 
that religious extremism and recently Islamic extremism is a byproduct of the lack of access to 
quality religious education, government hindrance of school choice and the lack of pluralism in 
public schooling and not necessarily caused by religious schooling. We use the coding of 
historical cases and summary statistics to support our claims. This preliminary analysis suggests 
that school choice interventions may, over the long term, reduce the incidence of terrorism in 
Western societies. 
Contextual history and theory of Islamic schooling and organization 
Five framing considerations are vital to our exploratory study. First, Islam has a long and 
storied educational tradition that mainly has been privately operated and decentralized. Second, 
the major branches of Islam, Sunni and Shia, are distinct in ways that inform our consideration of 
private school choice and terrorism. Third, traditionalism and fundamentalism is a second 
distinction within Islam that is largely independent of the Sunni-Shia divide. Fourth, a lack of 
exposure to high-quality religious instruction appears to be contributing to the modern terrorist 
activity of some Muslims. Fifth, high-quality Islamic religious instruction in the West is likely to 
be fostered by a system of private Islamic schools financially supported and partially overseen by 
government. 
Islamic schooling tradition    
Up to the eleventh century, Islamic schooling was primarily self-funded and 
philanthropic. Schooling in mosques and in the madrasas took place free of government 
intervention. Egger (2004, p. 220) notes “[t]he madrasa never displaced the mosque as an 
educational institution. In fact, Muslims were never precise in distinguishing between the two, 
because education and worship took place in both.” This period is often remembered as the 
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golden age of Islam due to its high scholarly accomplishment and education attainment. 
Increased state intervention in schooling starting in the eleventh century occurred 
contemporaneously with a decline in Islamic scholarship and reduced tolerance of minorities, 
perhaps reflecting regime goals superseding religious goals. Decentralization and a market 
orientation were the key attributes of Islamic schooling up to that time (Coulson, 1999; Durrant, 
1950, p. 94, 304).  
The Sunni-Shia distinction 
Religious tradition is often complicated. Much of Sunni Islam is decentralized whereas 
Shia Islam is essentially centralized. This distinction has important implications. The violent 
extremists of Sunni Islam become self-empowered and interpret Islam in ways that justify their 
values and actions (Gambetta, & Hertog, 2016). Sunni extremists practice violence horizontally 
while Shia extremists do so vertically, meaning that the former harm fellow religious comrades 
and declare them as apostates while the latter target ‘perceived opponents.’ By every count Al-
Qaeda, Taliban, ISIS and other Sunni terrorist organizations have killed far more Sunni Muslims 
than other groups have done. On the other hand, Shia Militias seldom attack their co-religionists, 
largely because Shia central authorities (Ayatollahs) must authorize such violent acts. 
Islamic traditionalism versus fundamentalism  
The divide between Islamic traditionalism and fundamentalism is central to the schooling 
and terrorism story. Traditionalism involves following the four jurisprudential schools of thought 
in Sunni Islam of Hanafi, Shafi’i, Hanbali and Maliki. Fundamentalism rejects these established 
theological practices and often goes against the theological consensus of the traditionalist 
interpretations, called the ijma. Traditionalists are less likely than fundamentalists to get involved 
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in terrorism as traditionalists are influenced by historic institutions, scholarly consensus and a 
variation in interpretation of religious texts, all of which possess market attributes.  
Traditionalists view family and civic values as highly salient, while these commitments 
tend to be weaker for fundamentalists. Literal interpretation of the text of The Quran is central to 
the fundamentalist doctrines of Salafism and Wahhabism (Hill, Knitter, & Madges, 1997). 
Fundamentalism lacks mass appeal, but in societies where socio-economic and political vacuums 
exist, fundamentalism has gained legitimacy. Almost all major Sunni terrorist organizations 
identify their ideology as fundamentalist (Salafism or Wahhabism). In the theological sense, 
Sunni fundamentalism confronts the theological consensus of traditionalist Muslim scholars and 
jurists. The majority of Islamic fundamentalists do not practice violence yet the correlation 
between fundamentalism and violence is strong. We now focus on the possibility that quality 
Islamic instruction could moderate the trail to terror for Sunni fundamentalists that form the 
majority. 
Quality instruction grounded in an authentic understanding of Islamic tradition, culture, and 
values 
 
Growing numbers of new converts to Islam have suddenly joined jihad. Ten to 25 percent 
of terrorists are Western converts to Islam, including approximately 30 percent of American 
jihadists, a remarkably high percentage given their very small numbers (Roy, 2008; New 
America, 2017). While most life-long Muslims have received a substantial amount of religious 
instruction in their mosques and schools, converts to Islam lack depth to their Islamic training 
due to a general lack of exposure to quality Islamic instruction.  
This article defines quality Islamic instruction as grounded in an authentic understanding 
of Islamic tradition, culture, and values. High quality instruction, regardless of topic, promotes 
cognitive outcomes like educational achievement and attainment and also non-cognitive 
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outcomes like grit and perseverance. For example, Dutch Islamic schools outperform comparison 
schools in improving student non-cognitive skills on three dimensions: reflections, skills, and 
civic attitudes and have a positive effect on student cognitive outcomes after controlling for 
student socio-economic background (Dronkers, 2016).  
A lack of quality religious instruction grounded in an authentic understanding of Islamic 
tradition, culture, and values appears to contribute to terrorist activity. Most Western terror 
recruiters and the individuals who commit terror are less likely to know classical Arabic or be 
trained in traditional Islamic sciences2 and thus lack the authority to issue a fatwa3 (Kareem, 
2014; Oakford, 2014). In lieu of quality Islamic instruction, the typical Islamic consumer may 
not be able to distinguish between the opportunity cost of choosing the religious signal from a 
traditionalist who opposes terrorism over that of a fundamentalist who condones or encourages 
it.  
Many Muslim youth in the West lack a religious identity, as they neither attend mosque 
nor vigorously nurture a strong religious identity (Haddad & Lummis, 1987; Smith, 2000). 
Qualitative work in Islamic schools shows that children draw upon Islamic education for their 
identity and to give their life meaning (Driessen, & Valkenberg, 2000; Hussain, & Read, 2015; 
Mohme, 2017; Smith, 2000; Zine, 2006). Lack of access to quality & overtly religious schooling 
is thus not a boon but a bane for promoting civic values (Berner, 2017). The traditional public 
schools are often large, bureaucratic, and lack religious and other values. Hence, they leave 
                                                     
2 Traditional Islamic sciences include Islamic jurisprudence and its methodology primarily based on the Quran and 
the traditions of the prophet of Islam. Islamic sciences differ from western sciences as the former are laid around 
revealed Islamic texts and spirituality. Worship forms the core of the former while for the latter acquiring material 
knowledge is the main motivation. 
3 Literal meaning is Islamic opinion (it takes the form of a verdict when issued by a jurist). In Western democracies, 
a fatwa is often a non-binding Islamic verdict issued by an influential religious authority.  
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young people hungry for meaning (Berner, 2017; Chubb, & Moe, 1990; Powell, Farrar, & 
Cohen, 1985).  
 Western Islam seeks to be in accord with modernity. Almost all Western mosques 
welcome Muslims of both genders. The challenge for Islam, however, is that new converts to the 
faith and the current generation of Muslims coming of age in the West often lack access to 
quality instruction to communicate the theological depth, diversity, traditions, and values of 
Islam. The social and purposive needs of Muslims, especially if they are young or converts to the 
religion, may be better addressed through private schools of choice, as market oriented 
organizations are better at dispensing incentives to individuals to prompt them to contribute 
activity to collective enterprises (Clark and Wilson, 1961). Under school choice systems, 
consumers are able to maximize their religious, spiritual and cultural utility by their choice of a 
school for their child. Such programs operate under the purview of the legal and democratic 
process (Wolf & Macedo, 2004; Glenn, De Groof, & Candal, 2012; Mohme, 2017).  
Role of independent religious schools 
Limited local access to quality religious instruction creates a bad market for the potential 
Islamic consumer. The problem concerning religious extremism and Islam, we contend, can be 
thought of as an example of market failure. The market for Islamic religious instruction in most 
parts of the world arguably is suffering from a lack of four key market components: (1) quality 
options, (2) variation in theological instruction, (3) operational autonomy from the state, and (4) 
competition among religious institutions based on observable outcomes. Increases in the delivery 
of education specifically through government schooling reduces the variance in Islamic 
theological instruction by reducing the size of the market for religious schools. State intervention 
in religious institutions also gives rise to special interest groups, which, if fundamentalist, 
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become a source for the government to stay in power. Consequently, fundamentalism gains 
influence in the absence of local quality options, as we have seen recently in Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan.  
Religious education is handled, broadly, in three different ways across countries (Wolf & 
Macedo, 2004; Glenn, De Groof & Candal, 2012).  In most nation-states, religious schools 
operate entirely in the private sector, with no subsidies and little involvement from government.  
Some countries, from the Middle East to Great Britain, provide faith based religious instruction 
in government-run public schools. For political reasons such as regime maintenance, these 
governments influence the instruction in religious schools. Finally, many Western countries 
permit private religious schools to receive government subsidies to support the education of 
students that choose to attend such schools (Dronkers & Robert, 2008). Even though the 
government regulation of religious schools under private school choice systems ranges from 
minimal to only moderate at most (Glenn, De Groof, & Candal, 2012), a substantial amount of 
research shows that private school choice contributes to civic values and tolerance, and no 
evidence indicates that civic attitudes and social cohesion degrades due to school choice (Greene, 
1998; Dronkers, 2004; Wolf, 2008; Shafiq & Myers, 2014; Carlson, Chingos, &Campbell, 
2017). 
Religious schools might be more apt to promote civic values as they cater to the spiritual 
development of the soul and encourage stronger family ties. Wolf (2008, p. 487) says “[t]his 
seems to be the case particularly among ethnic minorities (such as Latinos) in places with great 
ethnic diversity (such as New York City and Texas), and when Catholic schools are the schools 
of choice.” The overlap of education and religion is not new to the Western democracies and the 
local churches played a role in the original American public schools. Ironically, while America 
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denies the role of religion in its public schools, many European democracies have embraced 
school choice that includes state-funded religious schools (Berner, 2017; Maranto & van 
Raemdonck, 2015).  
As private schools, we contend that religious schools are best accountable to consumers 
in the form of parents and not to the government. Chubb and Moe (1990) develop the likely 
superiority of consumer rather than state driven schooling. They argue that institutional reform is 
the key to better schools and an indirect control of the schools through markets and parental 
choice is the best hope for educational effectiveness.  
Numerous studies done on private schools have established that religious schooling 
contributes to civic values and practices much more strongly than public schooling (DeAngelis 
& Wolf, 2016; Bettinger & Slonim, 2006; Mills & Wolf, 2016). Dronkers (2016) shows that 
Dutch Islamic schools not only have a positive value added for student achievement after 
controlling for socio-economic background, but also the schools do well on non-cognitive 
measures. Merry and Driessen (2016) report that in 2002, the Dutch Education Inspectorate 
concluded that 90% of the Islamic schools were aiding the process of integration of Muslims in 
Dutch society. Abernathy (2005) notes that increased competition due to school choice affected 
the voting behavior for the state of New Jersey. Basford and Traeger (2014) have shown Somali 
students adapted to civic values and expressed a greater acceptance of American society in the 
ethnocentric charter schools in Minneapolis, consistent with similar findings for Somalis in the 
private school choice environment of Sweden (Mohme, 2017). Catholic schooling in the U.S. has 
contributed to successful integration in society (Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993). Catholic schools 
enroll growing number of non-Catholic and minority students (McDonald, 2000) and produce 
equal or better civic outcomes than traditional public schools (Wolf, 2007; Berner, 2017). The 
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relatively new Islamic schools in the U.S. are likely to contribute towards the common good in a 
similar fashion to the relatively older Catholic schools. Thus, a deep grounding in one’s faith and 
religious community through Islamic schooling can in fact facilitate successful assimilation 
within a largely secular society. We argue this holds for Islamic schools in the cultural West.  
In contrast, state control or state influence in religious schools has a history of promoting 
intolerance when compared to decentralized and privately administered religious schools. There 
are far fewer fighters in the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields from India, which is home to the third-
largest population of Muslims,4 than from other Muslim and Western countries. Concerning the 
ongoing wars in Iraq and Syria, calculations5 for number of foreign fighters per million people 
by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence do not list 
India. This is not to say that few Indian Muslims have not gone overseas to join the terrorist 
organizations, but their representation is least after taking the Indian Muslim population’s size 
and India’s history of religious conflicts in account. India’s religious schools are largely free of 
government control and the Islamic religious institutions (madrasas6) in India have strongly 
protested any government attempt to bring the religious institutions under its control.  
Conditions differ where the state regulates religious schools to promote particular 
religious schooling for regime support. There could be objections to this hypothesis that the geo-
politics of the countries are different, however, none other than Al-Qaeda expressed frustration 
with this by releasing a video entitled ‘Why is there no storm in your river?’ (Ahmad, 2013). Al-
Qaeda’s frustration with Indian Muslims has continued to grow till today.7 The Syrian and Iraqi 
                                                     
4 Hackett (2015) says that by 2050, Indian will have world’s largest population of Muslims. 
5 http://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html 





battlefield has more fighters from Western nations both in numbers and in proportion to their 
Muslim population than from many Muslim majority nations. Weaver (2015) says “More British 
Muslims have joined Islamist militant groups than serve in the country’s armed forces.” 
Sociology should address why Indian Muslims, who arguably have genuine grievances, join 
foreign battlefields in far lower proportions than Pakistani, Saudi, and Western raised 
individuals. A potential explanation is the existence of state-independent madrasas in India, 
which provide the Muslims with stakes in the system and thus reduce radicalization and 
terrorism.  
  In summary, observers may be incorrect in ascribing the trail to terror to Islamic religious 
schools. The assumption that public schools promote tolerance and private religious schools 
promote intolerance should be empirically tested. An important arena in which to test this claim 
is regarding the most intolerant of acts: terrorism in the cultural West. Islamic schools operating 
independently in choice-based educational markets need to please parents, who, after all, do not 
want their children to become terrorists. State support for authentic Islamic religious schools in 
the West could provide the instruction for young Muslims truer to the Muslim faith and less 
critical of the West because it would be transparent and subject to public scrutiny. O’Neill (2010, 
p. 68) notes that a majority of Islamic schools in the U.S. are governed independently of local 
mosques. Independent religious schools, supported by the state, could be a highly effective anti-
terrorism vehicle in the cultural West. We think that the evidence from terrorist activities to date 
provide empirical support for our claim. 
Data  
This section describes the data sources for testing if religious and specifically Islamic 
schooling is associated with successful cases of homegrown terror or not. Before beginning the 
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project, we contacted major experts in the area to get their views on the question of private 
schooling and western terrorists. The views by Robert Pape at the University of Chicago, 
Thomas Hegghammer at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Diego Gambetta at 
European University Institute, Joshua Freilich at The City University of New York  and Brent 
Smith at the University of Arkansas were constructive. The New America Foundation provided 
the complete list of fatal jihadist and right wing attacks since 9/11. Databases like The National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of 
Maryland were also searched to see if they collected information on the educational background 
of terrorists. Freilich et al. (2014) provided useful data which was crosschecked with the other 
sources. Mueller (2013) included individual case studies which helped us trace the history of 
western terrorists. Internet searches were used to fill some data gaps. We combined all of this 
information into a single database of the educational and backgrounds of all western terrorists 
since 9/11. To the best of our knowledge, our database is the first to codify information on all 
levels and types of schooling of western terrorists. We then used the database to test the claim 
that private religious schooling promotes terrorist activity.  
Research Design 
The study is based on collecting the high school profile of individuals raised in the West 
who successfully committed acts of terror on the western soil. The article does not delve into 
questions of foreign and domestic politics or religion and ideology since they have been studied 
elsewhere, as described in the framing sections above. This study focuses on the single vital 




Although our analysis is confined to acts of terror in the U.S., we discuss some European 
terror events to explore the external validity of our findings. We focus our research on the U.S. 
because:  
1)     It does not share a border with countries that directly suffer terror or insurgency, so terrorist 
infiltration is of little concern (Laqueur, 2016).  
2)     It does not have a territorial dispute that is tied to acts of terror.  
3)     It is not known to have inflicted state sponsored violence on citizens in the post-Soviet era.8  
4)     It is economically prosperous and defends many individual liberties, so individuals born 
and raised in the U.S. have few obvious motivations to commit acts of terrorism.  
Indeed, Francis Fukuyama (1992), in The End of History and the Last Man, claimed there existed 
a consensus that the West had discovered the formula for societal success. All countries, 
according to Fukuyama, would soon evolve toward the model of capitalist democracy common 
in North American, Europe, the much of Asia. Until quite recently, with the notable exception of 
the IRA and Basque separatists in Spain, domestic terrorism was almost non-existent in the west.  
To the best of our knowledge, no prior research has examined systematically the 
educational background of Western born terrorists. As a preliminary analysis, we focus only on 
the high school level of education, recording attendance at public or private schools. Data for 
schooling of all the terrorists at all levels from K-12 is not available. A lack of control variables 
measuring non-schooling factors that could influence terrorist activity means that our analysis is 
merely exploratory and not causal. Although even a single act of terror is a regrettable horror, 
                                                     




from a statistical sense, the sample of people who have committed terrorist acts in the U.S. since 
9/11 is small. Future associations between private schooling and terrorist activity might be 
different should additional acts take place that diverge from the pattern we describe here. 
The terrorists analyzed in this paper are limited to those born and raised in the U.S., with 
right-wing affiliations, who actually managed to commit an act of terror. We limit our study to 
right-wing terrorists because Jihadist ideology is a politically conservative form of extremism 
(Lee, 2011). For example, Ismaaiyl Brinsley9 may have been inspired by Black Lives Matter but 
we exclude his case because BLM does not advocate violence and is not politically conservative. 
Similarly John Allen Muhammad, the “Beltway sniper”, was a U.S.-born Muslim who spread 
terror but his purpose was to kill his ex-wife in order to gain custody of their children. The 
terrorism he engaged in was instrumental to making his wife’s murder look like a terrorist act, so 
we exclude him. Naveed Afzal Haq clearly committed an act of terror but his prior actions 
include arrest for public exposure and other behaviors that suggest mental illness, and not right-
wing ideology, motivated him to commit terror. Finally, we exclude cases such as Alton Nolen in 
Oklahoma where the possible terrorist was accused but never legally charged with a terror-linked 
crime.10 One takeaway from the data below is that there really are not very many actual 
successful U.S. born and raised ideologically motivated Muslim terrorists, certainly not 
compared to Europe. But are private Islamic schools associated with the few terrorists who have 
emerged from the American Muslim community over the past 16 years? That is our question 
here.  
Consistent with the principles of Bayesian inference (Edwards, Lindman & Savage, 
1963), we first determine the percentage of Muslims in the U.S. who attend private high schools 
                                                     
9 Information available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201412200060 
10 Information available at http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/terror-plot.html?id=1793 
17 
 
to find an empirical basis for an increased likelihood of a U.S. Muslim committing terrorism due 
to attending private Islamic schools. Then we compare that likelihood of having attended a 
private high school, given that a person is an American Muslim, with the likelihood of them 
having been privately educated, given that they committed a terrorist act.  
Results 
We conduct separate analyses of explicitly jihadist terrorists (table 1 A) and non-jihadist 
right-wing terrorists (table 1 B). Out of the twelve profiles of jihadist terrorists, we could collect 
educational data on only seven. For the thirty-three profiles of right-wing non-jihadist terrorists, 
we could collect educational data for only fifteen. All seven jihadist individuals are males who 
attended public schools. Of the fifteen right-wing non-jihadist terrorists for which we were able 
to obtain data, eleven attended public schools, three attended private schools, and one was 
homeschooled.  
[table 1 A about here] 
[table 1 B about here] 
To determine if these limited associations between private schooling and terrorism 
suggest a connection between the two, we consult data on private school attendance in general 
and private Islamic school attendance in particular. In 2013-2014, 208 private Islamic schools in 
the U.S. enrolled 35,295 students (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017a). A total of 
4,097 students were enrolled in Islamic high schools that year, representing just .03 percent of 
the 15.3 million secondary school students that year, as most Islamic schools in the U.S. end at 
grade 8 (Keyworth, 2006). O’Neill (2010, p. 5) reports that only three percent of American 
Muslims attend private Islamic schools. Since approximately ten percent of high school students 
in the U.S. attend private schools (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017b), the 
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likelihood of a Muslim attending a private Islamic school is lower than the general likelihood of 
private school attendance. Given that a U.S. born adult is a Muslim, there is a 3 percent chance 
that he attended a private school. Given that a U.S. born adult is a Muslim terrorist, there is a 0 
percent chance that he attended a private high school. Thus, although the actual educational 
histories of seven Muslim terrorists do not support the claim that private Islamic schools 
encourage people to commit terrorist acts, they also do not necessarily support the claim that 
private Islamic schools discourage people from becoming terrorists. It is possible that the main 
reason why no U.S. Muslim terrorists have been privately educated is because so few U.S. 
Muslims attend private Islamic schools.    
The evidence regarding non-jihadist right-wing terrorists is similarly inconclusive. Given 
that a person is a U.S. born adult, there is a 10 percent chance that he attended a private high 
school. Given that a U.S. born adult is a right-wing terrorist, there is a 20 percent chance that he 
attended a private high school. Although private school attendance is associated with a higher 
likelihood of having committed a right-wing terrorist act, with only 15 cases to draw from, this 
preliminary analysis is only suggestive of such a link.     
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
With limited data, this analysis indicates that there is lack of empirical basis to claim that 
religious and specifically Islamic schooling in the United States is associated with homegrown 
terrorism. Among the U.S.-raised Muslims charged with committing or attempting to commit 
acts of terrorism in the west, all for whom we have data attended traditional public schools. 
There is an interesting historical analogy, in that in the 19th and early 20th Century American 
Catholic schools were seen as divisive to the polity. In fact, as the past 30 years of research has 
shown, Catholic schools seem to increase rather than decrease patriotism, civic activity, 
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tolerance as well as effectiveness (Bryk, Lee & Holland, 1993; Manno & Graham, 2001; 
Campbell, 2008). The same could be true of Muslim schools in the U.S.; however, their current 
small scale provides little evidence at this point to confirm that possibility.  
Greater access to religious schooling may benefit the society and religious schooling may 
moderate the frequency of acts of terror in the West. A key recommendation for policy makers is 
to encourage decentralized and private school choice and evaluation of Islamic schools based on 
measurable outcomes. This recommendation is especially acute as Muslim nations suffer from 
bad governance, unpopular regimes, restless and uneducated youth (Hackett et al., 2016; Ummid 
news, 2015). Decentralized and private religious schooling could moderate the causal link 
between hate and violence in the form of terrorism. Local quality Islamic education and the 
higher education of Imams of mosques in U.S. universities may also promote tolerance among 
Muslims. A lack of quality local schooling options in the Middle East have increased the role of 
Saudi Salafi and Wahhabi Islam funded by petrodollars. A market oriented approach to Islamic 
schooling can increase adherence to the traditional approach to Islam and weaken 
fundamentalism. Government can aide this process through greater access to private religious 
schools. An alternate approach is to also provide religious instruction in existing public schools; 
this may increase the plurality of public education that may add to creating democratic citizens 
(Berner, 2017). In many cases it could be possible that the marginal terrorist can be brought back 
to sanity if his or her spiritual and social needs can be met through religious schooling. 
School choice has the potential to serve disadvantaged minorities better than public 
schools (Tooley, 2009; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015; Howell & Peterson, 2006). In 
religious private schools, students from other religions and cultures self-select for a better quality 
of education, generating social and religious diversity within such private schools (Trivitt & 
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Wolf, 2011). It is surprising to know that this doesn’t only happen in affluent Catholic schools in 
some countries outside the U.S. but also in some of the not so affluent Islamic schools in India 
which Hindu students self-select into for educational needs (Al Jazeera English, 2013). This 
shows that the market produces more options for diversity and acceptance by choice. The 
schools created for the disadvantaged minorities in a free-market would be open to everyone. 
The decision to create a school for minorities would again be based on consumer demand and not 
regime goals that might be antithetical to political tolerance. 
We acknowledge that some findings of terrorists having attended religious private 
schools goes against our hypothesis that market and plural education is better than a statist 
approach to education. However, as mere attendance at a public school does not make one a 
democratic citizen, mere attendance at a religious school does not make one a fundamentalist or 
terrorist. Further research is need for the few cases where terrorists attended religious schools to 
see if religious values were in fact translated to these individuals at the schools. Additionally, 
researchers need to examine if terrorists built a socio-religious identity due to their religious 
schooling that then led them strike at their fellow citizens with terrorism. We hypothesize they 
did not.  
This study aims to encourage further research into the education profiles of people who 
commit violence and, secondly, calls for evaluation and proper design of Islamic curriculum in 
schools which can cater to the social and spiritual needs of Muslims. Independent researchers, 
child psychologists, trained religious instructors and sociologists should build upon the 
pioneering work of Jaap Dronkers in this field. To support such research, government agencies 
should produce more detailed and comprehensive databases regarding the backgrounds of people 
who commit terrorist acts. We drew from multiple data sources for this study and still only 
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obtained the evidence that we needed from about half of the cases that could have been included 
in the study.   
We think there is good reason to believe that providing increased access to modern 
Islamic schooling in the U.S. would address the spiritual and religious needs of Muslim students. 
Providing people with a stake in society through a system of school choice can be a way to 





Abernathy, S. F. (2005). School choice and the future of American democracy. University of 
Michigan Press. 
Ahmad, T. (2013). (2013, June 27). Al-Qaeda’s India dilemma. The New Indian Express. 
Retreived from http://www.newindianexpress.com/columns/Al-Qaedas-India-
dilemma/2013/06/27/article1654347.ece 
Al Jazeera English. (2013). Madrassas in India Attract Hindu Students. Retrieved from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/indiaonline/2013/11/madrassas-india-attract-
hindu-students-2013111814457229891.html 
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. (2011). 10 reasons why private school 
vouchers should be rejected. Retrieved from https://www.au.org/church-state/february-
2011-church-state/featured/10-reasons-why-private-school-vouchers-should-be. 
Basford, L. E. & Traeger, H. M. (2014). A Somali school in Minneapolis. In Fox, R. A., & 
Buchanan, N. K. (Eds.). Proud to be different: Ethnocentric niche charter schools in 
America. R&L Education. 
Bergen, P. & Pandey, S. (2005, June 14). The madrassa myth. New York Times. 
Berman, E., Felter, J., Kapstein, E. B. & Shapiro, J. (2015, March 16). How empirical studies of 
political violence (can) help policymakers. Washington Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/16/how-empirical-
studies-of-political-violence-can-help-policymakers/ 
Berner, A. R. (2017). Pluralism and American public education: No one way to school. Springer. 
23 
 
Bettinger, E., & Slonim, R. (2006). Using experimental economics to measure the effects of a 
natural educational experiment on altruism. Journal of Public Economics, 90(8), 1625-
1648. 
Bhatt, A., & Silber, M. D. (2007). Radicalization in the west: The homegrown threat. New York: 
New York City Police Department. 
Biglan, A. (2015, March 8). Where terrorism research goes wrong. The New York Times, p. 




Bryk, A. S., Lee, V. E., & Holland, P. B. (1993). Catholic schools and the common good. 
Harvard University Press. 
Campbell, D. E. (2008). Civic side of school choice: An empirical analysis of civic education in 
public and private schools, The. BYU L. Rev., 487. 
Carlson, D., Chingos, M.M., & Campbell, D.E. (2017). The effect of private school vouchers on 
political participation: Experimental evidence from New York City. Journal of Research 
on Educational Effectiveness, 10(3), 545-569. 
Chubb, J. E., & Moe, T. M. (1990). America's public schools: Choice is a panacea. The 
Brookings Review, 8(3), 4-12. 
Clark, P. B., & Wilson, J. Q. (1961). Incentive systems: A theory of organizations. 
Administrative science quarterly, 129-166. 
Coulson, A. J. (1999). Market education: The unknown history (Vol. 21). Transaction Publishers. 
Dawkins, R. (2006). The god delusion. Houghton Mifflin Company. 
24 
 
DeAngelis, C., & Wolf, P. J. (2016). The school choice voucher: A 'get out of jail' card?. 
Available at SSRN 2743541. 
Driessen, G., & Valkenberg, P. (2000). Islamic schools in the Netherlands: compromising 
between identity and quality?. British Journal of Religious Education, 23(1), 15-26. 
Dronkers, J. (2004). Do public and religious schools really differ? Assessing the European 
evidence. In Wolf, P. J., & Macedo, S. (Eds.), Educating citizens: International 
perspectives on civic values and school choice (287-312). Brookings Institution Press. 
Dronkers, J., & Robert, P. (2008). Differences in scholastic achievement of public, private 
government-dependent, and private independent schools: A cross-national analysis. 
Educational Policy, 22(4), 541-577. 
Dronkers, J. (2016). Islamic primary schools in The Netherlands. Journal of School Choice, 
10(1), 6-21. 
Durant, W. (1950). The age of faith: A history of Medieval Civilization-Christian, Islamic, and 
Judaic-from Constantine to Dante: AD 325-1300. The Story of Civilization, Part Four. 
Simon & Schuster. 
Edwards, W., Lindman, H., & Savage, L.J. (1963). Bayesian statistical inference for 
psychological research. Psychological Review, 70, 193-242. 
Forster, G. (2016). A win-win solution: The empirical evidence on school choice. Indianapolis, 
IN: Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice. 
Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and freedom. University of Chicago Press. 
Freilich, J,D., S.M. Chermak, R. Belli, J. Gruenewald, & W. Parkin. (2014). Introducing the 




Fukuyama, F. (2002). The end of history and the last man. Simon and Schuster.  
Gambetta, D., & Hertog, S. (2016). Engineers of jihad: The curious connection between violent 
extremism and education. Princeton University Press. 
Glenn, C. L., De Groof, J., & Candal, C. S. (2012). Balancing freedom, autonomy and 
accountability in education. Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP). 
Greene, J. P. (1998). Civic values in public and private schools. Learning from school choice, 
83-106. 
Gutmann, A. (1999). Democratic education. Princeton University Press. 
Hackett, C. (2015). By 2050, India to have world’s largest populations of Hindus and Muslims. 
Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Retrieved from 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/21/by-2050-india-to-have-worlds-largest-
populations-of-hindus-and-muslims/ 
Hackett, C., McClendon, D., Potančoková, M., & Stonawski, M. (2016). Religion and education 
around the world. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Retrieved from 
http://www.pewforum.org/2016/12/13/religion-and-education-around-the-world/ 
Haddad, Y. Y., & Lummis, A. T. (1987). Islamic values in the United States: A comparative 
study. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Harris, S. (2011). The moral landscape: How science can determine human values. Simon and 
Schuster. 
Hill, B., Knitter, P. F., & Madges, W. (1997). Faith, religion & Theology: A contemporary 
introduction. Twenty-Third Publications. 




Hoffer, E. (1951). The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of movements. New York NY: 
HarperCollins. 
Howell, W. G., & Peterson, P. E. (2006). The education gap: Vouchers and urban schools. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Hussain, S., & Read, J. N. G. (2015). Islamic schools in the United States and England: 
Implications for integration and social cohesion. Social Compass, 62(4), 556-569. 
Kareem, B. A. (2014). What we learn from ISIS list of “scholars.” Retrieved from 
http://www.bilalabdulkareem.com/scholars1/ 
Keyworth, K. (2006). Trial by fire: Islamic schools after 9-11. Islamic Schools League of 
America. 
Laqueur, W. (2016). A history of terrorism: Expanded edition. Transaction Publishers. 
Lee, A. (2011). Who becomes a terrorist?: Poverty, education, and the origins of political 
violence. World Politics, 63, pp 203-245 doi:10.1017/S0043887111000013. 
Lyons-Padilla, S., Gelfand, M. J., Mirahmadi, H., Farooq, M., & van Egmond, M. (2015). 
Belonging nowhere: Marginalization & radicalization risk among Muslim immigrants. 
Behavioral Science & Policy, 1(2), 1-12. 
 
Manno, B. & Graham, H. (2001). Research on Catholic school effectiveness. In Hunt, T. C., 
Joseph, E. A., & Nuzzi, R. J. (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Catholic Education. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Maranto, R. & Raemdonck, D. C. V. (2015, January 8). Letting education and religion overlap. 
Why expanding vouchers to include parochial schools is a good idea. The Wall Street 
27 
 
Journal. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/robert-maranto-and-dirk-c-van-
raemdonck-letting-education-and-religion-overlap-1420761949 
Merry, M. S., & Driessen, G. (2016). On the right track? Islamic schools in the Netherlands after 
an era of turmoil. Race Ethnicity and Education, 19(4), 856-879. 
Mills, J. N., & Wolf, P. J. (2016). The effects of the Louisiana scholarship program on student 
achievement after two years. Available at SSRN 2738805. 
McDonald, D. (2000). United States Catholic elementary and secondary schools 1999- 2000: 
Annual statistical report on schools, enrollment and staffing. Washington, DC: National 
Catholic Educational Association. 
Mohme, G. (2017). Somali Swedes’ reasons for choosing a Muslim-profiled school—
Recognition and educational ambitions as important influencing factors. Journal of 
School Choice, 1-19. 
Mueller, J. E. (Ed.). (2013). Terrorism since 9/11: The American cases. Retrieved from 
http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/since.html 
Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman. V. (2015). The aggregate effect of school choice evidence 
from a two-stage experiment in India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(3), 
1011-1066. 
National Center for Education Statistics. (2017a). Private School Survey 2013-14. Retrieved 
from:  https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pss/privateschoolsearch/. 
National Center for Education Statistics. (2017b). Fast facts. Retrieved from: 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=65. 




Oakford, S. (2014). Muslim scholars make the theological case against the Islamic State. 
Retrieved from https://news.vice.com/article/muslim-scholars-make-the-theological-case-
against-the-islamic-state 
O'Neill, M. R. (2010). Muslim mothers: Pioneers of Islamic education in America (Doctoral 
dissertation, College Of Notre Dame Of Maryland). 
Pape, R. (2005). Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. Random House. 
Powell, A. G., Farrar, E., & Cohen, D. K. (1985). The shopping mall high school. Winners and 
losers in the educational marketplace. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Roy, O. (2008). Islamic terrorist radicalisation in Europe. European Islam. Challenges for public 
policy and society, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 52-60. 
Schbley, A. (2003). Defining religious terrorism: A causal and anthological profile. Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, 26(2), 105-134. 
Shafiq, M. N., & Myers, J. P. (2014). Educational vouchers and social cohesion: A statistical 
analysis of student civic attitudes in Sweden, 1999–2009. American Journal of 
Education, 121(1), 111-136. 
Smith, J. (2000). Islam in America. New York: Colombia University Press. 
Stern, J. (2000). Pakistan's Jihad culture. Foreign Affairs, 115-126. 
Stern, J. (2016). Radicalization to extremism and mobilization to violence. What have we 
learned and what can we do about It?. The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 668(1), 102-117. 
Stotsky, S. (2011). The stealth curriculum. In Sarah N. Stern (eds.) Saudi Arabia and the global 
Islamic terrorist network. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan. 
29 
 
Tooley, J. (2009). The beautiful tree: A personal journey into how the world's poorest people are 
educating themselves, Washington, D. C.: Cato Institute.  
Trivitt, J., & Wolf, P.J. (2011). School choice and the branding of Catholic schools. Education 
Finance and Policy, 6(2), 202-245. 
Ummid news. (2015). 40% of Muslim world's population unable to read or write: Study. 
Retrieved from http://www.ummid.com/news/2015/February/11.02.2015/literacy-in-
muslim-world.html 
Weaver, M. A. (2015, April 14). Her majesty’s jihadists. The New York Times, p. SR12. 
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/her-majestys-
jihadists.html?_r=0 
Wolf, P. J., & Macedo, S. (Eds.). (2004). Educating citizens: International perspectives on civic 
values and school choice. Brookings Institution Press. 
Wolf, P. J. (2007). Civics exam. Education Next, 7(3). Retrieved from 
http://educationnext.org/civics-exam/. 
Wolf, P. J. (2008). School voucher programs: What the research says about parental school 
choice. BYU L. Rev., 415. 
Wolf, P. J. (2016). In tribute: Jaap Dronkers, 1945-2016. Journal of School Choice, 10(2), 137-
139. Retrieved from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15582159.2016.1176786. 
Zine, J. (2006). Unveiled sentiments: Gendered Islamophobia and experiences of veiling among 






Table 1 A: Successful jihadist terror attacks committed in U.S. by U.S. born and raised 
individuals since 9/11. 




Jihadist John Allen 
Muhammad 
Killed by suspects prior to the 
spree in Washington DC 
2002 Public Scotlandville 
Magnet High 
School 
Jihadist Joel Henry 
Hinrichs III 
University of Oklahoma 
Bombing 





Seattle Jewish Federation 
Shooting 






Little Rock Shooting 2009 Public Memphis’ 
Craigmont 
High School 
Jihadist Major Nidal 
Hasan 





Ibrahim shot and killed 25-
year-old Hanny Tawadros and 
27-year-old Amgad Konds 
after he abducted them in 
February 2013 and buried 
them in a shallow grave in 
Atlantic County. 




Washington and New Jersey 
Killing Spree 
2014     
Jihadist Ismaaiyl 
Brinsley 
shot two NYPD cops in 
Brooklyn's Bed Stuy 
neighborhood 
2014     
Jihadist Zale 
Thompson 




San Bernardino shooting in 
California 
2015 Public La Sierra 
High School 
Jihadist Omar Mir 
Seddique 
Mateen 
Orlando nightclub shooting 2016 Public Martin 
County High 
School 
Jihadist  Joshua 
Cummings 
Colorado Security Guard 
Shooting 
2017     
31 
 
Note: Results are derived from basic internet searches. Cells for which data was not available 
through internet searches have been left blank. 
 
Table 1 B: Successful right wing terror attacks committed in U.S. by U.S. born and raised 
individuals since 9/11. 





Wade Lay Tulsa OK, Bank 
Robbery 





Tulsa OK, Bank 
Robbery 







2008     
Right 
Wing 
Keith Luke Brockton, MA 
Murders 




Scott Roeder George Tiller 
Assassination 








2009 Public JvB was educated 















Pima County, AZ 






Pima County, AZ 
2009     
Right 
Wing 
Shawna Forde Flores Murders, 
Pima County, AZ 





Austin, TX Plane 
Attack 








2010     
Right 
Wing 






































St. John's Parish 
Police Ambush 




















Eric Frein Blooming Grove 
Police Shooting 




Derrick Smith St. John's Parish 
Police Ambush 
2012     
Right 
Wing 
Terry Smith St. John's Parish 
Police Ambush 
2012     
Right 
Wing 
Chanel Skains St. John's Parish 
Police Ambush 
2012     
Right 
Wing 
Britney Keith St. John's Parish 
Police Ambush 





St. John's Parish 
Police Ambush 
2012     
Right 
Wing 
Jerad Miller Las Vegas Police 
Ambush 




Amanda Miller Las Vegas Police 
Ambush 








2014     
Right 
Wing 
Dylann Roof Charleston Church 
Shooting 




Robert Dear Colorado Planned 
Parenthood 
Shooting 









2017 Private  Friends School of 
Baltimore 
Note: Results are derived from basic internet searches. Cells for which data was not available 
through internet searches have been left blank. 
